Hi Mike,
As posted previously, U.S. President Grover Cleveland Gave Hawaii Back to Queen Liliuokalani Twice (2x)…and article to "Restore the Queen"....
Reference: http://iolani-theroyalhawk.bl
Tuesday, April 17, 2018
The following President: U.S. President William McKinley had the Army, Navy, and federal workers "develop" the Territory of Hawaii, then he "proclaimed" Hawaii to be part of the U.S.... …
References:
1) IN RE AH HO, et. al., HAWAII REPORTS, 1899, Volume 11 pages 654 - 667,. Supreme Court/Archives/Main Library, Honolulu, Oahu, Hawaii
2) PA PELEKANE case, 1912, HAWAIIAN REPORTS, page 177...Supreme Court/Archives/ Main Library, Honolulu, Oahu, Hawaii ….. in the "Territory's" attorney general's brief "That the Territory as successor to the Kingdom of Hawaii..."
To assume a foreign nation is illegal or not legal.
References:
(1)
Prof. Williamson Chang: On Annexation of Hawaii, Scalia Fails Constitutionality Test
March 8, 2015
Publication
Honolulu Civil Beat
Media URL
-
Williamson B.C. Chang, “Darkness over Hawaii: Annexation Myth Greatest Obstacle to ... Justice Scalia in his recent remarks
-
JUDICIAL TAKINGS: ROBINSON V ARIYOSHI REVISITED Williamson B.C. Chang* I.
The following additional cases/information support the Doctrine of Political question:
1)
Saturday, April 14, 2018
Updated: "The Doctrine of Political Question" Applies to All Land Cases.....Important, Mahalo Joyclynn Costa!
11 years ago on April 13th on a Friday myself and 3 others stood in front a Judge. We were accused of Criminal Trespass II reduced to Simple Trespass. The day we got arrested they put it on the 10 news about activist fighting for "Hawaiian" land. Wrong, we were standing for our rights and kuleana. After being looped in the system for months we had our day in court. The Prosecutor said if we could prove separation of jurisdiction and powers from both the State of Hawaii a...nd the United States the Judge could recognize our claim. Our point was they could not apply their authority on Hawaiian Nationals. There were 16 arrested that day. On April 13 on a Friday I delivered what the prosecutor requested. I handed the clerk, to hand to the Judge, a letter from the late Senator Inouye. He was a United State Senator for the State of Hawaii. (two birds w/ one stone) He could not come to our trial due to a mandated Constitutional Separation of Powers. I looked it up and found within the Separation of Powers was "The Doctrine of Political Question". In this doctrine it speaks of land if created by another Country can not be decided in court. It is of a political matter between the Executives. The Judge took a look at the letter asked a few questions flipped thru his books and accepted my oral motion to dismiss with prejudice. The prosecutor had nothing else to rebut and the Judge rendered a decision to grant the Dismissal with Prejudice. I know this was not of my doing but the grace of ke Akua that worked this case. You see we were not suppose to appear that because the case was already dismissed w/out prejudice. The Judge asked why our names were on the calendar and all they could say was it was a mistake. My dad stood with me and he had his say in court. A week later all others were also dismissed w/prejudice. All 16!!!! Since then we have lost a few of those warriors. This post is dedicated to them. I miss you Bradah Lonohiwa Kekahuna.
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2) "In the exercise of the power conferred by the first of those two provisions, the President of the United States, on August 12, 1898, directed, by proclamation, that "the civil, judicial and military powers in question shall be exercised by the officers of the Republic of Hawaii, as it existed just prior to the transfer of sovereignty, subject to his power to remove such officers and to fill vacancies," and after reiterating the second of these and other provisions of the Resolution, further directed that, "under these various provisions, the Government of the islands will proceed without interruption." The intention of Congress was to continue the existing government of the islands in operation without interruption, except in s far as it might be inconsistent with the Constitution or treaties of the United States or with the terms of the Resolution. Subject to this limitation only, the judicial power was to continue as it existed just prior to the transfer of sovereignty."
Reference: IN RE AH HO, et. al., HAWAII REPORTS, 1899, Volume 11 pages 654 - 667,. Supreme Court/Archives/Main Library, Honolulu, Oahu, Hawaii
3) " CONCLUSION
In recent years, most commentators who have considered the political question doctrine have attacked it either as an anomoly with no proper place in American jurisprudence or as a mirage that will disappear if we stare at it hard enough. Because they have based their criticisms on an implausible judicial monopoly assumption, however, these commentators have failed to show that the political doctrine question is inconsistent with our constitutional tradition. On the contrary, the political question doctrine is an integral part of that tradition; it is largely concerned with distinguishing cases in which courts will exercise their power of judicial review from those in which they will not. In our system of government, the three branches of the federal government share responsibility for interpreting the Constitution. In general, the courts' role is to protect the oppressed from abuses of government power. They refrain from exercising review in cases far removed from that paradigm. We should understand the political question doctrine as a device for projecting this shared reponsibility scheme into areas where no substantive doctrine puts it into effect. Judicial abstinence, in this sense, is not a threat to the rule of law;
296 In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), for example, the Court decided that the issue of what defines "traditional governmental functions" could not be resolved in a satisfactory way. Accordingly, it abandoned an approach to federalism questions that depended on such a definition. See id. at 537-47. 297 One can argue that using the political question doctrine for this purpose is greatly preferable to formulating a substantive doctrine that eliminates meaningful judicial review. Ordinarily, when courts leave an issue to the political branches of government, they should admit that they are doing so. If courts wrap their abstinence in a substantive doctrine, they are more likely to mislead some members of Congress into believing that any governmental action that gets past the courts is constitutional. A frank statement that an issue is not for judicial resolution is more likely to make Congress and the President aware of their responsibility for constitutional interpretation of those issues. [I]f we are wrong [legislators] say, the courts will correct it. If what I have been saying is true, the safe and permanent road toward reform is that of impressing upon our people a far stronger sense than they have of the great range of possible harm and evil that our system leaves open, and must leave open, to the legislatures, and of the clear limits of judicial power; so that responsibility may be brought sharply home where it belongs . . . . Under no system can the power of courts go far to save a people from ruin; our chief protection lies elsewhere. If this be true, it is of the greatest public importance to put the matter in its true light. Thayer, supra note 87, at 155-56 (footnote omitted).
1988]
176 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 137:97
constitutional norms can be meaningful even without judicial enforcement. Moreover, abstinence with respect to certain constitutional issues is a necessary implication of the rule of law. Our law requires that courts contain the conflict between the myth of law and the myth of politics. Without relying on formalism, they can maintain a balance between those two myths only by limiting the exercise of judicial review. In the last analysis, the legitimacy of judicial review depends on a shared sense that judges should enforce the Constitution in order to preserve our fundamental liberties. Any exercise of judicial review that seems far removed from this purpose will provoke charges of judicial usurpation. The political question doctrine allows courts to remove themselves from areas in which they do not belong so that they may focus on the important tasks our system alots to them. By doing so, they can avoid calling the legitimacy of their actions into question."
In recent years, most commentators who have considered the political question doctrine have attacked it either as an anomoly with no proper place in American jurisprudence or as a mirage that will disappear if we stare at it hard enough. Because they have based their criticisms on an implausible judicial monopoly assumption, however, these commentators have failed to show that the political doctrine question is inconsistent with our constitutional tradition. On the contrary, the political question doctrine is an integral part of that tradition; it is largely concerned with distinguishing cases in which courts will exercise their power of judicial review from those in which they will not. In our system of government, the three branches of the federal government share responsibility for interpreting the Constitution. In general, the courts' role is to protect the oppressed from abuses of government power. They refrain from exercising review in cases far removed from that paradigm. We should understand the political question doctrine as a device for projecting this shared reponsibility scheme into areas where no substantive doctrine puts it into effect. Judicial abstinence, in this sense, is not a threat to the rule of law;
296 In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985), for example, the Court decided that the issue of what defines "traditional governmental functions" could not be resolved in a satisfactory way. Accordingly, it abandoned an approach to federalism questions that depended on such a definition. See id. at 537-47. 297 One can argue that using the political question doctrine for this purpose is greatly preferable to formulating a substantive doctrine that eliminates meaningful judicial review. Ordinarily, when courts leave an issue to the political branches of government, they should admit that they are doing so. If courts wrap their abstinence in a substantive doctrine, they are more likely to mislead some members of Congress into believing that any governmental action that gets past the courts is constitutional. A frank statement that an issue is not for judicial resolution is more likely to make Congress and the President aware of their responsibility for constitutional interpretation of those issues. [I]f we are wrong [legislators] say, the courts will correct it. If what I have been saying is true, the safe and permanent road toward reform is that of impressing upon our people a far stronger sense than they have of the great range of possible harm and evil that our system leaves open, and must leave open, to the legislatures, and of the clear limits of judicial power; so that responsibility may be brought sharply home where it belongs . . . . Under no system can the power of courts go far to save a people from ruin; our chief protection lies elsewhere. If this be true, it is of the greatest public importance to put the matter in its true light. Thayer, supra note 87, at 155-56 (footnote omitted).
1988]
176 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 137:97
constitutional norms can be meaningful even without judicial enforcement. Moreover, abstinence with respect to certain constitutional issues is a necessary implication of the rule of law. Our law requires that courts contain the conflict between the myth of law and the myth of politics. Without relying on formalism, they can maintain a balance between those two myths only by limiting the exercise of judicial review. In the last analysis, the legitimacy of judicial review depends on a shared sense that judges should enforce the Constitution in order to preserve our fundamental liberties. Any exercise of judicial review that seems far removed from this purpose will provoke charges of judicial usurpation. The political question doctrine allows courts to remove themselves from areas in which they do not belong so that they may focus on the important tasks our system alots to them. By doing so, they can avoid calling the legitimacy of their actions into question."
Hope the above information/background, court cases helps...…..all rule of law.
aloha.
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On Wed, May 30, 2018 at 7:50 AM, Michael Lee <keakuaskahu777@yahoo.com> wrote:
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Dear Friends;
The first pdf deals with my cousin Routhe Bolomet getting the UN to look at the Hawaiian Kingdom Sovereignty issue.
Mike Lee
Since my input regarding the Hawaiian Kingdom will not assist the courts...I am not going to be allowed oral argument. I've sent these two things.
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