"
SPECIAL MESSAGES.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, Washington, December 18, 1893.
To the Senate and House of Representatives:
In my recent annual message to the Congress I briefly referred to our
relations with Hawaii and expressed the intention of transmitting
further information on the subject when additional advices permitted.
Though I am not able now to report a definite change in the actual
situation, I am convinced that the difficulties lately created both
here and in Hawaii, and now standing in the way of a solution through
Executive action of the problem presented, render it proper and
expedient that the matter should be referred to the broader authority
and discretion of Congress, with a full explanation of the endeavor
thus far made to deal with the emergency and a statement of the
considerations which have governed my action.
I suppose that right and justice should determine the path to be
followed in treating this subject. If national honesty is to be
disregarded and a desire for territorial extension or dissatisfaction
with a form of government not our own ought to regulate our conduct, I
have entirely misapprehended the mission and character of our Government
and the behavior which the conscience of our people demands of their
public servants.
When the present Administration entered upon its duties, the Senate
had under consideration a treaty providing for the annexation of the
Hawaiian Islands to the territory of the United States. Surely under our
Constitution and laws the enlargement of our limits is a manifestation
of the highest attribute of sovereignty, and if entered upon as an
Executive act all things relating to the transaction should be clear and
free from suspicion. Additional importance attached to this particular
treaty of annexation because it contemplated a departure from unbroken
American tradition in providing for the addition to our territory of
islands of the sea more than 2,000 miles removed from our nearest coast.
These considerations might not of themselves call for interference with
the completion of a treaty entered upon by a previous Administration,
but it appeared from the documents accompanying the treaty when
submitted to the Senate that the ownership of Hawaii was tendered to us
by a Provisional Government set up to succeed the constitutional ruler
of the islands, who had been dethroned, and it did not appear that such
Provisional Government had the sanction of either popular revolution or
suffrage. Two other remarkable features of the transaction naturally
attracted attention. One was the extraordinary haste, not to say
precipitancy, characterizing all the transactions connected with the
treaty. It appeared that a so-called committee of safety, ostensibly the
source of the revolt against the constitutional Government of Hawaii,
was organized on Saturday, the 14th day of January; that on Monday, the
16th, the United States forces were landed at Honolulu from a naval
vessel lying in its harbor; that on the 17th the scheme of a Provisional
Government was perfected, and a proclamation naming its officers was
on the same day prepared and read at the Government building; that
immediately thereupon the United States minister recognized the
Provisional Government thus created; that two days afterwards, on the
19th day of January, commissioners representing such Government sailed
for this country in a steamer especially chartered for the occasion,
arriving in San Francisco on the 28th day of January and in Washington
on the 3d day of February; that on the next day they had their first
interview with the Secretary of State, and another on the 11th, when the
treaty of annexation was practically agreed upon, and that on the 14th
it was formally concluded and on the 15th transmitted to the Senate.
Thus between the initiation of the scheme for a Provisional Government
in Hawaii, on the 14th day of January, and the submission to the Senate
of the treaty of annexation concluded with such Government the entire
interval was thirty-two days, fifteen of which were spent by the
Hawaiian commissioners in their journey to Washington.
In the next place, upon the face of the papers submitted with the treaty
it clearly appeared that there was open and undetermined an issue of
fact of the most vital importance. The message of the President
accompanying the treaty4 declared that "the overthrow of the monarchy
was not in any way promoted by this Government," and in a letter to the
President from the Secretary of State, also submitted to the Senate with
the treaty, the following passage occurs:
At the time the Provisional Government took possession of the Government
buildings no troops or officers of the United States were present or
took any part whatever in the proceedings. No public recognition was
accorded to the Provisional Government by the United States minister
until after the Queen's abdication and when they were in effective
possession of the Government buildings, the archives, the treasury, the
barracks, the police station, and all the potential machinery of the
Government.
But a protest also accompanied said treaty, signed by the Queen and her
ministers at the time she made way for the Provisional Government, which
explicitly stated that she yielded to the superior force of the United
States, whose minister had caused United States troops to be landed at
Honolulu and declared that he would support such Provisional Government.
The truth or falsity of this protest was surely of the first importance.
If true, nothing but the concealment of its truth could induce our
Government to negotiate with the semblance of a government thus created,
nor could a treaty resulting from the acts stated in the protest have
been knowingly deemed worthy of consideration by the Senate. Yet the
truth or falsity of the protest had not been investigated.
I conceived it to be my duty, therefore, to withdraw the treaty from the
Senate for examination, and meanwhile to cause an accurate, full, and
impartial investigation to be made of the facts attending the subversion
of the constitutional Government of Hawaii and the installment in
its place of the Provisional Government. I selected for the work of
investigation the Hon. James H. Blount, of Georgia, whose service of
eighteen years as a member of the House of Representatives and whose
experience as chairman of the Committee of Foreign Affairs in that body,
and his consequent familiarity with international topics, joined with
his high character and honorable reputation, seemed to render him
peculiarly fitted for the duties intrusted to him. His report detailing
his action under the instructions given to him and the conclusions
derived from his investigation accompany this message.
These conclusions do not rest for their acceptance entirely upon
Mr. Blount's honesty and ability as a man, nor upon his acumen and
impartiality as an investigator. They are accompanied by the evidence
upon which they are based, which evidence is also herewith transmitted,
and from which it seems to me no other deductions could possibly be
reached than those arrived at by the commissioner.
The report, with its accompanying proofs and such other evidence as is
now before the Congress or is herewith submitted, justifies, in my
opinion, the statement that when the President was led to submit the
treaty to the Senate with the declaration that "the overthrow of the
monarchy was not in any way promoted by this Government," and when the
Senate was induced to receive and discuss it on that basis, both
President and Senate were misled.
The attempt will not be made in this communication to touch upon all
the facts which throw light upon the progress and consummation of this
scheme of annexation. A very brief and imperfect reference to the facts
and evidence at hand will exhibit its character and the incidents in
which it had its birth.
It is unnecessary to set forth the reasons which in January, 1893, led
a considerable proportion of American and other foreign merchants and
traders residing at Honolulu to favor the annexation of Hawaii to the
United States. It is sufficient to note the fact and to observe that
the project was one which was zealously promoted by the minister
representing the United States in that country. He evidently had an
ardent desire that it should become a fact accomplished by his agency
and during his ministry, and was not inconveniently scrupulous as to the
means employed to that end. On the 19th day of November, 1892, nearly
two months before the first overt act tending toward the subversion of
the Hawaiian Government and the attempted transfer of Hawaiian territory
to the United States, he addressed a long letter to the Secretary of
State, in which the case for annexation was elaborately argued on moral,
political, and economical grounds. He refers to the loss to the Hawaiian
sugar interests from the operation of the McKinley bill and the tendency
to still further depreciation of sugar property unless some positive
measure of relief is granted. He strongly inveighs against the existing
Hawaiian Government and emphatically declares for annexation. He says:
In truth, the monarchy here is an absurd anachronism. It has nothing on
which it logically or legitimately stands. The feudal basis on which it
once stood no longer existing, the monarchy now is only an impediment to
good government—an obstruction to the prosperity and progress of the
islands.
He further says:
As a Crown colony of Great Britain or a Territory of the United States
the government modifications could be made readily and good
administration of the law secured. Destiny and the vast future interests
of the United States in the Pacific clearly indicate who at no distant
day must be responsible for the government of these islands. Under a
Territorial government they could be as easily governed as any of the
existing Territories of the United States. * * * Hawaii has reached
the parting of the ways. She must now take the road which leads to Asia,
or the other, which outlets her in America, gives her an American
civilization, and binds her to the care of American destiny.
He also declares:
One of two courses seems to me absolutely necessary to be
followed—either bold and vigorous measures for annexation or a "customs
union," an ocean cable from the Californian coast to Honolulu, Pearl
Harbor perpetually ceded to the United States, with an implied but not
expressly stipulated American protectorate over the islands. I believe
the former to be the better, that which will prove much the more
advantageous to the islands and the cheapest and least embarrassing in
the end to the United States. If it was wise for the United States,
through Secretary Marcy, thirty-eight years ago, to offer to expend
$100,000 to secure a treaty of annexation, it certainly can not be
chimerical or unwise to expend $100,000 to secure annexation in the near
future. To-day the United States has five times the wealth she possessed
in 1854, and the reasons now existing for annexation are much stronger
than they were then. I can not refrain from expressing the opinion with
emphasis that the golden hour is near at hand.
These declarations certainly show a disposition and condition of mind
which may be usefully recalled when interpreting the significance of the
minister's conceded acts or when considering the probabilities of such
conduct on his part as may not be admitted.
In this view it seems proper to also quote from a letter written by the
minister to the Secretary of State on the 8th day of March, 1892, nearly
a year prior to the first step taken toward annexation. After stating
the possibility that the existing Government of Hawaii might be
overturned by an orderly and peaceful revolution, Minister Stevens
writes as follows:
Ordinarily, in like circumstances, the rule seems to be to limit the
landing and movement of United States forces in foreign waters and
dominion exclusively to the protection of the United States legation
and of the lives and property of American citizens; but as the relations
of the United States to Hawaii are exceptional, and in former years
the United States officials here took somewhat exceptional action in
circumstances of disorder, I desire to know how far the present minister
and naval commander may deviate from established international rules
and precedents in the contingencies indicated in the first part of this
dispatch.
To a minister of this temper, full of zeal for annexation, there seemed
to arise in January, 1893, the precise opportunity for which he was
watchfully waiting—an opportunity which by timely "deviation from
established international rules and precedents" might be improved to
successfully accomplish the great object in view; and we are quite
prepared for the exultant enthusiasm with which, in a letter to the
State Department dated February 1, 1893, he declares:
The Hawaiian pear is now fully ripe, and this is the golden hour for
the United States to pluck it.
As a further illustration of the activity of this diplomatic
representative, attention is called to the fact that on the day the
above letter was written, apparently unable longer to restrain his
ardor, he issued a proclamation whereby, "in the name of the United
States," he assumed the protection of the Hawaiian Islands and declared
that said action was "taken pending and subject to negotiations at
Washington." Of course this assumption of a protectorate was promptly
disavowed by our Government, but the American flag remained over the
Government building at Honolulu and the forces remained on guard until
April, and after Mr. Blount's arrival on the scene, when both were
removed.
A brief statement of the occurrences that led to the subversion of the
constitutional Government of Hawaii in the interests of annexation to
the United States will exhibit the true complexion of that transaction.
On Saturday, January 14, 1893, the Queen of Hawaii, who had been
contemplating the proclamation of a new constitution, had, in deference
to the wishes and remonstrances of her cabinet, renounced the project
for the present at least. Taking this relinquished purpose as a basis
of action, citizens of Honolulu numbering from fifty to one hundred,
mostly resident aliens, met in a private office and selected a so-called
committee of safety, composed of thirteen persons, seven of whom were
foreign subjects, and consisted of five Americans, one Englishman,
and one German. This committee, though its designs were not revealed,
had in view nothing less than annexation to the United States, and
between Saturday, the 14th, and the following Monday, the 16th of
January—though exactly what action was taken may not be clearly
disclosed—they were certainly in communication with the United States
minister. On Monday morning the Queen and her cabinet made public
proclamation, with a notice which was specially served upon the
representatives of all foreign governments, that any changes in the
constitution would be sought only in the methods provided by that
instrument. Nevertheless, at the call and under the auspices of the
committee of safety, a mass meeting of citizens was held on that day to
protest against the Queen's alleged illegal and unlawful proceedings and
purposes. Even at this meeting the committee of safety continued to
disguise their real purpose and contented themselves with procuring
the passage of a resolution denouncing the Queen and empowering the
committee to devise ways and means "to secure the permanent maintenance
of law and order and the protection of life, liberty, and property
in Hawaii." This meeting adjourned between 3 and 4 o'clock in the
afternoon. On the same day, and immediately after such adjournment, the
committee, unwilling to take further steps without the cooperation of
the United States minister, addressed him a note representing that the
public safety was menaced and that lives and property were in danger,
and concluded as follows:
We are unable to protect ourselves without aid, and therefore pray for
the protection of the United States forces.
Whatever may be thought of the other contents of this note, the absolute
truth of this latter statement is incontestable. When the note was
written and delivered the committee, so far as it appears, had neither
a man nor a gun at their command, and after its delivery they became so
panic-stricken at their position that they sent some of their number to
interview the minister and request him not to land the United States
forces till the next morning. But he replied that the troops had been
ordered and whether the committee were ready or not the landing should
take place. And so it happened that on the 16th day of January, 1893,
between 4 and 5 o'clock in the afternoon, a detachment of marines from
the United States steamer Boston, with two pieces of artillery,
landed at Honolulu. The men, upward of 160 in all, were supplied with
double cartridge belts filled with ammunition and with haversacks and
canteens, and were accompanied by a hospital corps with stretchers and
medical supplies.
This military demonstration upon the soil of Honolulu was of itself an
act of war, unless made either with the consent of the Government of
Hawaii or for the bona fide purpose of protecting the imperiled
lives and property of citizens of the United States. But there is no
pretense of any such consent on the part of the Government of the Queen,
which at that time was undisputed and was both the de facto and
the de jure Government. In point of fact the existing Government,
instead of requesting the presence of an armed force, protested against
it. There is as little basis for the pretense that such forces were
landed for the security of American life and property. If so, they would
have been stationed in the vicinity of such property and so as to
protect it, instead of at a distance and so as to command the Hawaiian
Government building and palace. Admiral Skerrett, the officer in command
of our naval force on the Pacific station, has frankly stated that in
his opinion the location of the troops was inadvisable if they were
landed for the protection of American citizens, whose residences and
places of business, as well as the legation and consulate, were in a
distant part of the city; but the location selected was a wise one if
the forces were landed for the purpose of supporting the Provisional
Government. If any peril to life and property calling for any such
martial array had existed, Great Britain and other foreign powers
interested would not have been behind the United States in activity to
protect their citizens. But they made no sign in that direction. When
these armed men were landed the city of Honolulu was in its customary
orderly and peaceful condition. There was no symptom of riot or
disturbance in any quarter. Men, women, and children were about the
streets as usual, and nothing varied the ordinary routine or disturbed
the ordinary tranquillity except the landing of the Boston's
marines and their march through the town to the quarters assigned them.
Indeed, the fact that after having called for the landing of the United
States forces on the plea of danger to life and property the committee
of safety themselves requested the minister to postpone action exposed
the untruthfulness of their representations of present peril to life and
property. The peril they saw was an anticipation growing out of guilty
intentions on their part and something which, though not then existing,
they knew would certainly follow their attempt to overthrow the
Government of the Queen without the aid of the United States forces.
Thus it appears that Hawaii was taken possession of by the United States
forces without the consent or wish of the Government of the islands,
or of anybody else so far as shown except the United States minister.
Therefore the military occupation of Honolulu by the United States
on the day mentioned was wholly without justification, either as an
occupation by consent or as an occupation necessitated by dangers
threatening American life and property. It must be accounted for in some
other way and on some other ground, and its real motive and purpose are
neither obscure nor far to seek.
The United States forces being now on the scene and favorably
stationed, the committee proceeded to carry out their original scheme.
They met the next morning, Tuesday, the 17th, perfected the plan of
temporary government, and fixed upon its principal officers, ten of whom
were drawn from the thirteen members of the committee of safety. Between
1 and 2 o'clock, by squads and by different routes to avoid notice, and
having first taken the precaution of ascertaining whether there was
anyone there to oppose them, they proceeded to the Government building
to proclaim the new Government. No sign of opposition was manifest, and
thereupon an American citizen began to read the proclamation from the
steps of the Government building, almost entirely without auditors.
It is said that before the reading was finished quite a concourse of
persons, variously estimated at from 50 to 100, some armed and some
unarmed, gathered about the committee to give them aid and confidence.
This statement is not important, since the one controlling factor in the
whole affair was unquestionably the United States marines, who, drawn
up under arms and with artillery in readiness only 76 yards distant,
dominated the situation.
The Provisional Government thus proclaimed was by the terms of the
proclamation "to exist until terms of union with the United States had
been negotiated and agreed upon." The United States minister, pursuant
to prior agreement, recognized this Government within an hour after the
reading of the proclamation, and before 5 o'clock, in answer to an
inquiry on behalf of the Queen and her cabinet, announced that he had
done so.
When our minister recognized the Provisional Government, the only basis
upon which it rested was the fact that the committee of safety had in
the manner above stated declared it to exist. It was neither a
government de facto nor de jure. That it was not in such possession
of the Government property and agencies as entitled it to recognition is
conclusively proved by a note found in the files of the legation at
Honolulu, addressed by the declared head of the Provisional Government
to Minister Stevens, dated January 17, 1893, in which he acknowledges
with expressions of appreciation the minister's recognition of the
Provisional Government, and states that it is not yet in the possession
of the station house (the place where a large number of the Queen's
troops were quartered), though the same had been demanded of the Queen's
officers in charge. Nevertheless, this wrongful recognition by our
minister placed the Government of the Queen in a position of most
perilous perplexity. On the one hand she had possession of the palace,
of the barracks, and of the police station, and had at her command at
least 500 fully armed men and several pieces of artillery. Indeed, the
whole military force of her Kingdom was on her side and at her disposal,
while the committee of safety, by actual search, had discovered that
there were but very few arms in Honolulu that were not in the service of
the Government.
In this state of things, if the Queen could have dealt with the
insurgents alone, her course would have been plain and the result
unmistakable. But the United States had allied itself with her enemies,
had recognized them as the true Government of Hawaii, and had put
her and her adherents in the position of opposition against lawful
authority. She knew that she could not withstand the power of the United
States, but she believed that she might safely trust to its justice.
Accordingly, some hours after the recognition of the Provisional
Government by the United States minister, the palace, the barracks, and
the police station, with all the military resources of the country, were
delivered up by the Queen upon the representation made to her that her
cause would thereafter be reviewed at Washington, and while protesting
that she surrendered to the superior force of the United States, whose
minister had caused United States troops to be landed at Honolulu and
declared that he would support the Provisional Government, and that she
yielded her authority to prevent collision of armed forces and loss of
life, and only until such time as the United States, upon the facts
being presented to it, should undo the action of its representative and
reinstate her in the authority she claimed as the constitutional
sovereign of the Hawaiian Islands.
This protest was delivered to the chief of the Provisional Government,
who indorsed thereon his acknowledgment of its receipt. The terms of the
protest were read without dissent by those assuming to constitute the
Provisional Government, who were certainly charged with the knowledge
that the Queen, instead of finally abandoning her power, had appealed to
the justice of the United States for reinstatement in her authority; and
yet the Provisional Government, with this unanswered protest in its
hand, hastened to negotiate with the United States for the permanent
banishment of the Queen from power and for a sale of her Kingdom.
Our country was in danger of occupying the position of having actually
set up a temporary government on foreign soil for the purpose of
acquiring through that agency territory which we had wrongfully put in
its possession. The control of both sides of a bargain acquired in such
a manner is called by a familiar and unpleasant name when found in
private transactions. We are not without a precedent showing how
scrupulously we avoided such accusations in former days. After the
people of Texas had declared their independence of Mexico they resolved
that on the acknowledgment of their independence by the United States
they would seek admission into the Union. Several months after the
battle of San Jacinto, by which Texan independence was practically
assured and established, President Jackson declined to recognize it,
alleging as one of his reasons that in the circumstances it became us
"to beware of a too early movement, as it might subject us, however
unjustly, to the imputation of seeking to establish the claim of our
neighbors to a territory with a view to its subsequent acquisition by
ourselves." This is in marked contrast with the hasty recognition of a
government openly and concededly set up for the purpose of tendering to
us territorial annexation.
I believe that a candid and thorough examination of the facts will force
the conviction that the Provisional Government owes its existence to
an armed invasion by the United States. Fair-minded people, with the
evidence before them, will hardly claim that the Hawaiian Government
was overthrown by the people of the islands or that the Provisional
Government had ever existed with their consent. I do not understand that
any member of this Government claims that the people would uphold it by
their suffrages if they were allowed to vote on the question.
While naturally sympathizing with every effort to establish a republican
form of government, it has been the settled policy of the United States
to concede to people of foreign countries the same freedom and
independence in the management of their domestic affairs that we have
always claimed for ourselves, and it has been our practice to recognize
revolutionary governments as soon as it became apparent that they were
supported by the people. For illustration of this rule I need only to
refer to the revolution in Brazil in 1889, when our minister was
instructed to recognize the Republic "so soon as a majority of the
people of Brazil should have signified their assent to its establishment
and maintenance;" to the revolution in Chile in 1891, when our minister
was directed to recognize the new Government "if it was accepted by the
people," and to the revolution in Venezuela in 1892, when our
recognition was accorded on condition that the new Government was "fully
established, in possession of the power of the nation, and accepted by
the people."
As I apprehend the situation, we are brought face to face with the
following conditions:
The lawful Government of Hawaii was overthrown without the drawing of a
sword or the firing of a shot by a process every step of which, it may
safely be asserted, is directly traceable to and dependent for its
success upon the agency of the United States acting through its
diplomatic and naval representatives.
But for the notorious predilections of the United States minister for
annexation the committee of safety, which should be called the committee
of annexation, would never have existed.
But for the landing of the United States forces upon false pretexts
respecting the danger to life and property the committee would never
have exposed themselves to the pains and penalties of treason by
undertaking the subversion of the Queen's Government.
But for the presence of the United States forces in the immediate
vicinity and in position to afford all needed protection and support the
committee would not have proclaimed the Provisional Government from the
steps of the Government building.
And finally, but for the lawless occupation of Honolulu under false
pretexts by the United States forces, and but for Minister Stevens's
recognition of the Provisional Government when the United States forces
were its sole support and constituted its only military strength, the
Queen and her Government would never have yielded to the Provisional
Government, even for a time and for the sole purpose of submitting her
case to the enlightened justice of the United States.
Believing, therefore, that the United States could not, under the
circumstances disclosed, annex the islands without justly incurring the
imputation of acquiring them by unjustifiable methods, I shall not again
submit the treaty of annexation to the Senate for its consideration, and
in the instructions to Minister Willis, a copy of which accompanies this
message, I have directed him to so inform the Provisional Government.
But in the present instance our duty does not, in my opinion, end with
refusing to consummate this questionable transaction. It has been the
boast of our Government that it seeks to do justice in all things
without regard to the strength or weakness of those with whom it deals.
I mistake the American people if they favor the odious doctrine that
there is no such thing as international morality; that there is one law
for a strong nation and another for a weak one, and that even by
indirection a strong power may with impunity despoil a weak one of its
territory.
By an act of war, committed with the participation of a diplomatic
representative of the United States and without authority of Congress,
the Government of a feeble but friendly and confiding people has been
overthrown. A substantial wrong has thus been done which a due regard
for our national character as well as the rights of the injured people
requires we should endeavor to repair. The Provisional Government has
not assumed a republican or other constitutional form, but has remained
a mere executive council or oligarchy, set up without the assent of the
people. It has not sought to find a permanent basis of popular support
and has given no evidence of an intention to do so. Indeed, the
representatives of that Government assert that the people of Hawaii are
unfit for popular government and frankly avow that they can be best
ruled by arbitrary or despotic power.
The law of nations is founded upon reason and justice, and the rules of
conduct governing individual relations between citizens or subjects of a
civilized state are equally applicable as between enlightened nations.
The considerations that international law is without a court for its
enforcement and that obedience to its commands practically depends upon
good faith instead of upon the mandate of a superior tribunal only
give additional sanction to the law itself and brand any deliberate
infraction of it not merely as a wrong, but as a disgrace. A man of
true honor protects the unwritten word which binds his conscience more
scrupulously, if possible, than he does the bond a breach of which
subjects him to legal liabilities, and the United States, in aiming to
maintain itself as one of the most enlightened nations, would do its
citizens gross injustice if it applied to its international relations
any other than a high standard of honor and morality. On that ground the
United States can not properly be put in the position of countenancing a
wrong after its commission any more than in that of consenting to it in
advance. On that ground it can not allow itself to refuse to redress an
injury inflicted through an abuse of power by officers clothed with its
authority and wearing its uniform; and on the same ground, if a feeble
but friendly state is in danger of being robbed of its independence and
its sovereignty by a misuse of the name and power of the United States,
the United States can not fail to vindicate its honor and its sense of
justice by an earnest effort to make all possible reparation.
These principles apply to the present case with irresistible force when
the special conditions of the Queen's surrender of her sovereignty are
recalled. She surrendered, not to the Provisional Government, but to
the United States. She surrendered, not absolutely and permanently, but
temporarily and conditionally until such time as the facts could be
considered by the United States. Furthermore, the Provisional Government
acquiesced in her surrender in that manner and on those terms, not only
by tacit consent, but through the positive acts of some members of that
Government, who urged her peaceable submission, not merely to avoid
bloodshed, but because she could place implicit reliance upon the
justice of the United States and that the whole subject would be finally
considered at Washington.
I have not, however, overlooked an incident of this unfortunate affair
which remains to be mentioned. The members of the Provisional Government
and their supporters, though not entitled to extreme sympathy, have been
led to their present predicament of revolt against the Government of the
Queen by the indefensible encouragement and assistance of our diplomatic
representative. This fact may entitle them to claim that in our effort
to rectify the wrong committed some regard should be had for their
safety. This sentiment is strongly seconded by my anxiety to do nothing
which would invite either harsh retaliation on the part of the Queen or
violence and bloodshed in any quarter. In the belief that the Queen,
as well as her enemies, would be willing to adopt such a course as
would meet these conditions, and in view of the fact that both the Queen
and the Provisional Government had at one time apparently acquiesced
in a reference of the entire case to the United States Government,
and considering the further fact that in any event the Provisional
Government by its own declared limitation was only "to exist until terms
of union with the United States of America have been negotiated and
agreed upon," I hoped that after the assurance to the members of that
Government that such union could not be consummated I might compass a
peaceful adjustment of the difficulty.
Actuated by these desires and purposes, and not unmindful of the
inherent perplexities of the situation nor of the limitations upon
my power, I instructed Minister Willis to advise the Queen and her
supporters of my desire to aid in the restoration of the status existing
before the lawless landing of the United States forces at Honolulu on
the 16th of January last if such restoration could be effected upon
terms providing for clemency as well as justice to all parties
concerned. The conditions suggested, as the instructions show,
contemplate a general amnesty to those concerned in setting up the
Provisional Government and a recognition of all its bona fide
acts and obligations. In short, they require that the past should be
buried and that the restored Government should reassume its authority as
if its continuity had not been interrupted. These conditions have not
proved acceptable to the Queen, and though she has been informed that
they will be insisted upon and that unless acceded to the efforts of the
President to aid in the restoration of her Government will cease, I have
not thus far learned that she is willing to yield them her acquiescence.
The check which my plans have thus encountered has prevented their
presentation to the members of the Provisional Government, while
unfortunate public misrepresentations of the situation and exaggerated
statements of the sentiments of our people have obviously injured the
prospects of successful Executive mediation.
I therefore submit this communication, with its accompanying exhibits,
embracing Mr. Blount's report, the evidence and statements taken by him
at Honolulu, the instructions given to both Mr. Blount and Minister
Willis, and correspondence connected with the affair in hand.
In commending this subject to the extended powers and wide discretion of
the Congress I desire to add the assurance that I shall be much
gratified to cooperate in any legislative plan which may be devised for
the solution of the problem before us which is consistent with American
honor, integrity, and morality.
GROVER CLEVELAND"
Reference: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14137/14137-h/14137-h.htm.
1897
"
EXECUTIVE MANSION, February 10, 1897.
To the Senate of the United States:
In compliance with a resolution of the Senate of the 9th instant, the
House of Representatives concurring, I return herewith Senate bill No.
3328, entitled "An act to amend an act entitled 'An act to repeal the
timber-culture laws, and for other purposes.'"
GROVER CLEVELAND. "
"
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas public interests require that the Senate should be convened at
12 o'clock on the 4th day of March next to receive such communications
as may be made by the Executive:
Now, therefore, I, Grover Cleveland, President of the United States of
America, do hereby proclaim and declare that an extraordinary occasion
requires the Senate of the United States to convene at the Capitol, in
the city of Washington, on the 4th day of March next, at 12 o'clock
noon, of which all persons who shall at that time be entitled to act as
members of that body are hereby required to take notice.
Given under my hand and the seal of the United States, at Washington,
the 24th day of February, A.D. 1897, and of the Independence of the
United States the one hundred and twenty-first.
[SEAL.]
GROVER CLEVELAND.
By the President
RICHARD OLNEY,
Secretary of State. "
Reference: http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14137/14137-h/14137-h.htm
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